Con frecuencia el judaísmo es considerado como un sistema cerrado de minuciosas prácticas, alejado de cualquier tendencia universalista. Aunque las comunidades judías estén extendidas por todo el mundo son percibidas como una minoría dispersa a lo largo de la historia y a lo ancho del planeta (tiempo y espacio) siempre luchando por preservar su identidad. La carencia de una autoridad central unitaria y el poco interés por el proselitismo ofrecen la imagen de una comunidad de creyentes enclaustrada y ensimismada. Con (...) frecuencia esta actitud se pone en contraste con la del cristianismo o la del islam, radicalmente orientados al proselitismo y la conversión sobre la base de una formulación apodíctica: fuera del grupo no hay salvación. El libro bíblico de Jonás muestra una tendencia diferente en el judaísmo naciente en torno al cambio de era. (shrink)

Revisión de Tesis Memorias, género y militancias: agencia y politicidad en las trayectorias de las mujeres integrantes de Madres de Plaza de Mayo-La Plata por M. E. Nieto.

We present an experiment designed to investigate three different mechanisms to achieve impartiality in distributive justice. We consider a first-person procedure, inspired by the Rawlsian veil of ignorance, and two third-party procedures, an involved spectator and a detached observer. First-person veiled stakeholders and involved spectators are affected by an initially unfair distribution that, in the stakeholders’ case, is to be redressed. We find substantial differences in the redressing task. Detached observers propose significantly fairer redistributions than veiled stakeholders or involved spectators. (...) Risk preferences partly explain why veiled stakeholders propose less egalitarian redistributions. Surprisingly, involved spectators, who are informed about their position in society, tend to favour stakeholders holding the same position as they do after the initial distribution. (shrink)

There is no systematic knowledge about how individuals with Locked-in Syndrome experience their situation. A phenomenology of LIS, in the sense of a description of subjective experience as lived by the ill persons themselves, does not yet exist as an organized endeavor. The present article takes a step in that direction by reviewing various materials and making some suggestions. First-person narratives provide the most important sources, but very few have been discussed. LIS barely appears in bioethics and neuroethics. Research on (...) Quality of Life provides relevant information, one questionnaire study explores the sense of personal continuity in LIS patients, and LIS has been used as a test case of theories in “embodied cognition” and to explore issues in the phenomenology of illness and communication. A systematic phenomenology of LIS would draw on these different areas: while some deal directly with subjective experience, others throw light on its psychological, sociocultural and materials conditions. Such an undertaking can contribute to the improvement of care and QOL, and help inform philosophical questions, such as those concerning the properties that define persons, the conditions of their identity and continuity, or the dynamics of embodiment and intersubjectivity. (shrink)

Since its emergence in the early 2000s, neuroethics has become a recognized, institutionalized and professionalized field. A central strategy for its successful development has been the claim that it must be an autonomous discipline, distinct in particular from bioethics. Such claim has been justified by the conviction, sustained since the 1990s by the capabilities attributed to neuroimaging technologies, that somehow ‘the mind is the brain’, that the brain sciences can illuminate the full range of human experience and behavior, and that (...) neuroscientific knowledge will have dramatic implications for views of the human, and challenge supposedly established beliefs and practices in domains ranging from self and personhood to the political organization of society. This article examines how that conviction functions as neuroethics’ ideological condition of possibility. (shrink)

RESUMEN En el prólogo a la segunda edición de la Crítica de la razón pura, ¿qué ha querido decir Kant con una “revolución del modo de pensar” que se debe aplicar a la metafísica para que tome el camino de la ciencia? Cabe distinguir dos significados: uno de carácter metodológico, que asume que el conocimiento rige a los objetos y tendría alcance. Aplicada a la metafísica, supone una transformación más profunda que permite hablar, en segundo lugar, de un significado metafísico (...) específico, que implica que el conocimiento constituye aquello mismo a lo que se llama el objeto de las representaciones. ABSTRACT What is Kant referring to when, in the Preface to the Second Edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, he speaks of the “revolution in the way of thinking” that is needed for metaphysics to enter the path of science? Two meanings are possible. The first is a methodological one, which assumes that knowledge governs objects and would, therefore, extend to metaphysics. Applied to the latter, a more profound transformation is needed, one that would make it possible to speak of a specific metaphysical meaning entailing that knowledge constitutes the object of representations. (shrink)

En el prólogo a la segunda edición de la Crítica de la razón pura, ¿qué ha querido decir Kant con una “revolución del modo de pensar” que se debe aplicar a la meta-física para que tome el camino de la ciencia? Cabe distinguir dos significados: uno de carácter metodológico, que asume que el conocimiento rige a los objetos y ten-dría alcance. Aplicada a la metafísica, supone una transformación más profunda que permite hablar, en segundo lugar, de un significado metafísico específico, (...) que implica que el conocimiento constituye aquello mismo a lo que se llama el objeto de las representaciones. (shrink)

Conservativity in generalized quantifiers is linked to presupposition filtering, under a propositions-as-types analysis extended with dependent quantifiers. That analysis is underpinned by modeltheoretically interpretable proofs which inhabit propositions they prove, thereby providing objects for quantification and hooks for anaphora.

When is humanitarian intervention legitimate and how should such interventions be conducted? This article sets out eight liberal principles that underlie humanitarian intervention, some of them abstract principles of international ethics and others more concrete principles that apply specifically to humanitarian intervention. It argues that whilst these principles do not determine the legitimacy of particular interventions, they should ?incline? our judgments towards approval or disapproval. The basic principles include the liberal idea that governments are the mere agents of the people, (...) that tyrannical governments forfeit their legal protections, that human rights entail obligations for governments, that justifiable intervention must intend the end of tyranny or anarchy, that the doctrine of double-effect should be respected, that intervention is only warranted in severe cases, that intervention be welcomed by those it is intended to save, and that ideally it is welcomed by the community of democratic states. (shrink)

This article analyzes the financial performance and managerial abilities of a sample of US and European socially responsible (SR) mutual funds. The period analyzed commences from January 1994 and concludes in January 2013 and yields 18 US and 89 European green funds. The results obtained for green fund managers are compared with those achieved for conventional and other forms of SR mutual fund managers. We control for the mutual fund investment objective (distinguishing between domestic and global portfolios) and for the (...) effect of crisis market periods. For US SR funds, partitioning the data into crisis and normal periods reveals that SR funds obtain statistically insignificant performance in crisis periods but underperform relative to the market in normal periods. Furthermore, the findings indicate that green funds do not perform worse than other forms of SR mutual funds. For European SR funds partitioning the data into crisis and normal periods reveals that SR funds obtain statistically insignificant performance irrespective of market conditions. Similar to the US findings, green Europe SR funds do not perform worse than other forms of SR mutual funds. Managerial abilities are not evident in the findings though unsuccessful timing of the market is revealed for both Europe and US global green funds. When analyzing managerial abilities in crisis and non-crisis market periods, US green fund managers achieve better results in crisis market periods and the opposite occurs for green fund managers in European market. (shrink)

La oposición a Hegel mediante la cual con frecuencia la tradición presenta la filosofía schopenhaueriana se ha interpretado en ocasiones como una relación de dependencia, en la medida en que aquella habría surgido como una cierta reacción frente a la de Hegel. El artículo muestra que los documentos disponibles acerca de los comienzos de la relación de Schopenhauer con Hegel hacen insostenible tal supuesto, además de ofrecer un marco y diversas claves para comprender su posterior polémica con el hegelianismo.

Edward Nelson published in 1986 a book defending an extreme formalist view of mathematics according to which there is an impassable barrier in the totality of exponentiation. On the positive side, Nelson embarks on a program of investigating how much mathematics can be interpreted in Raphael Robinson's theory of arithmetic Q. In the shadow of this program, some very nice logical investigations and results were produced by a number of people, not only regarding what can be interpreted in Q but (...) also what cannot be so interpreted. We explain some of these results and rely on them to discuss Nelson's position. (shrink)

Forsyth’s (1980) Ethics Position Questionnaire and Hunt et al.’s (1989) Corporate Ethical Value Questionnaire are used to examine the ethical ideologies of senior managers from organizations listed in the Australian Stock Exchange. The results indicate how corporate ethical values, religion, gender, and age are related to the idealism and relativism of senior Australian managers. After discussing the results, limitations of the study are offered. Finally, managerial implications are provided and recommendations for future research are given.

We give an elementary proof of the strong normalization of the atomic polymorphic calculus Fat.

ArgumentSeeing a prodigious cure happen and then testifying about it certainly differs from attending an air pump experiment in order to bear witness to it. Yet early-modern saint-making and the “new” or “experimental philosophy” shared juridical roots, and thereby an understanding of the role of testimony for the establishment of “matters of fact” and for the production of legitimate knowledge. The reforms carried out after the Council of Trent, especially during Urban VIII's pontificate, of the juridical procedures for saint-making in (...) the Catholic Church implied a new attitude towards the examination of proposed miracles. Most of these miracles were healings. While the appeal to medical expertise had long been common, and skepticism had often manifested itself regarding cures or extraordinary bodily phenomena, both were now given formal status. Miracle inquests henceforth leaned towards refuting miraculousness by means of natural explanations. The procedure was systematized in a treatise published in the 1730s by Prospero Lambertini. The combination of Lambertini's work with the canonization causes in which he acted as the “devil's advocate” in charge of disputing arguments favorable to a sainthood candidate allows for a reconstruction of the interplay between the juridical and scientific economies of saint-making, and of the role of testimony in the production of trust and evidence. (shrink)

[Given, If, Then] attempts to conceive a possibility of reading, through a set of readings: reading being understood as the relation to an Other that occurs prior to any semantic or formal identification, and, therefore, prior to any attempt at assimilating, or appropriating, what is being read to the one who reads. As such, it is an encounter with an indeterminable Other, an Other who is other than other -- an unconditional relation, and thus a relation to no fixed object (...) of relation. The first reading by Jeremy Fernando, "Blind Reading," unfolds through an attempt to speak of reading as an event. Untheorisable in itself, it is a positing of reading as reading, through reading, where texts are read as a test site for reading itself. As such, it is a meditation on the finitude and exteriority in literature, philosophy, and knowledge; where blindness is both the condition and limit of reading itself. Folded into, or in between, this (re)reading are a selection of photographs from Jennifer Hope Davy's image archive. They are on the one hand simply a selection of 'impartial pictures' taken, and on the other hand that which allow for something singular and, therefore, always other to dis/appear -- crossing that borderless realm between 'some' and 'some-thing.' Eventually, there is a writing on images on writings by Julia Hölzl. A responding to the impossible response, a re-iteration, a re-reading of what could not have been written, a re-writing of what could not have been read; these poems, if one were to name them such, name them as such, answer (to) the impossibility of answering: answer to no call. (shrink)

Finite-state methods are applied to determine the consequences of events, represented as strings of sets of fluents. Developed to flesh out events used in natural language semantics, the approach supports reasoning about action in AI, including the frame problem and inertia. Representational and inferential aspects of the approach are explored, centering on conciseness of language, context update and constraint application with bias.

Kant's Logic of the Pathological: Aesthetics and Politics.

O presente texto, de que se dá em seguida a tradução portuguesa, consiste numa selecção da correspondência entre F. W. J Schelling, J. C. F. Hölderlin e G. W. F. Hegel, três colegas e amigos do Stift de Tübingen, três vértices de uma das mais interessantes e importantes unidades teóricas do idealismo alemão e, por conseguinte, três elementos cujos anos de aprendizagem filosófica se revelam hoje essenciais para a boa compreensão da génese da sua época.

Partindo da inequívoca assumpção de que há um espírito comum entre Platão e o período do idealismo alemão, o presente ensaio propõe-se comprovar esta mesma tese analisando o conjunto de anotações intitulado “Über den Geist der Platonischen Philosophie”, coligido por Schelling ainda na fase pré-filosófica da sua evolução espiritual, em 1793. Da análise deste, e dos dois mitos aí contidos, esperase por sua vez que estes nos possam fornecer fortes indícios não só do quadro histórico-mitológico que está por detrás de (...) toda a filosofia idealista, mas também da possibilidade de que destes mitos nasçam os primeiros frémitos da primeiríssima filosofia de Schelling. (shrink)

Emergentes não raras vezes nas Lições de Antropologia de Kant, os termos “Einbildungskraft”, “Einbildungsfähigkeit” e “Imagination” são comummente tomados – e, prova maior disto mesmo, traduzidos – como um só. O presente artigo propõe-se pôr em causa e demonstrar a incorrecção desta abordagem. Bem pelo contrário, estamos em crer que, no âmbito da antropologia kantiana, em primeiro lugar, “faculdade de imaginação” e “capacidade de imaginação” não são uma e a mesma coisa, antes significam diferentes estratos, diferentes dimensões conceptuais na compreensão (...) do processo de representação humana; em segundo lugar, também “faculdade de imaginação”, enquanto “Einbildungskraft”, não é o mesmo que o seu correspondente na “Imagination”, antes duas dimensões de um e o mesmo problema antropológico, o problema por excelência do acto de representar, que surge entre o mundo e o designar humano. Tais distinções, que, assim o cremos, requerem uma compreensão mas também uma tradução mais criteriosa do que até aqui, trazem a uma mais distinta luz o modo como Kant estrutura e ordena as diferentes fases do processo da imaginação humana, e salienta aquelas que, para o filósofo, são as diferentes potencialidades desta última.__. (shrink)

Among the many stages of Kant’s problem of a reciprocal collocation of the human knowledges, Encyclopedism, quite unsurprisingly, is one of the most relevant; and yet, quite surprisingly, it is Anthropology which plays here one of the lead parts, insofar as the complex ascertainment of its definition, its position, its task proves to be of irrefutable importance towards solving the greater problem at hand. The question arises as the association – or dissociation – between Empirical Psychology and Pragmatic Anthropology, and (...) their inclusion in, or exclusion from, their greater or lesser relation with Metaphysics; a problem which, to the careless eye, seems to have been promoted by Kant himself. Here, opinions diverge as to the nature of the relation between the two sciences, from their total inter-dependence to their complete separation. We, in turn, propose a different approach. Our objective is to reenact Kant’s fundamental scheme of human knowledges, as presented not only in the only extant Lecture on Encyclopedism, but in various others dimensions of Kant’s academic activity; and here, to propose a contrasting analysis between Empirical Psychology and Pragmatic Anthropology; one, however, based not on the assumption of their consonance or dissonance through their characteristics, rather on their respective position and scope amid the field of human knowledges. As such, it is our intention to consider Kant’s Lectures in their interconnection, namely, in their apparently dubious simultaneous collocation of an Empirical Psychology as Anthropology; and, based on their specific position in the scheme of human knowledges, and what this position entails in terms of their scope and task, to ascertain to what extent Empirical Psychology is indeed Anthropology, and from what extent Empirical Psychology is no longer Anthropology – not, at least, Pragmatic Anthropology. In other words, we shall labor towards defining a dividing line in Kant’s scheme of human knowledges; one which for Kant represents a third dimension of knowledge and stands between rational and empirical, Metaphysics and the historical sciences; that line, in our view, being that of a cosmopolitical prism. Keywords: Kant, encyclopedism, anthropology, empirical psychology, cosmopolitanism. (shrink)

The main point of our study is that the Kantian problem of a suitability between theory and practice, one of the key issues in Kant’s practical thinking in general, was erroneously perceived not only by those who defended it, and conceived of its possibility, but also by those who denied it and defended its impossibility. Our position, conversely, is that Kant, upon approaching a seemingly irresoluble problem, was forced to conceive of a via media, an “intermediate member of connection” between (...) theory and practice; an alternative which, in our view, does not arise out of mere necessity, rather is intimately interconnected from the mid-1770s onwards with the formation of Kant’s fundamental scheme of human knowledges, a scheme which, in its tridimensionality, establishes Pragmatic Anthropology as a third dimension of human knowledge and therefore as the only suitable soil for the dialogue between theory and practice, beyond the mere possibility or impossibility of the problem. This proposition, we hope, will enable us to ascertain what Kant envisages by the “talent of nature”, the special “act of the power of judgment” that is to serve as connecting member between theory and practice; to explain how Anthropology is to be seen as the natural abode for this mediating interplay; and, finally, to better position, as well as delimit, the scope of Kant’s anthropo-cosmological view of Man in the World, which is to be seen precisely between the merely rational of theory and the merely empirical of practice. (shrink)

Between 1795 and 1796 Novalis produces a vast group of fragments on Fichte’s philosophy, the posthumously entitled “Fichte-Studien”. Among the topics therein approached, one of the most important is that of the _original action of the I _, and _the possible or impossible union of the opposites which model human life and thought_, feeling and reflection. The aim of this article is to inquire Novalis’ view of this problem of paramount importance for a philosophy of the I; namely, to investigate (...) the contours of Novalis’ circular conception of the problem, and its differences regarding Fichte; to expound the dilemma of the necessity and yet impossibility of a union between opposites; and to show how the young philosopher considers this problem both in its real and in its ideal prism, thereby proposing, as a solution, a _union in disunion_, an _possible union between opposites_, which Novalis affirms as a new conception of the circular study of the I and as the foundation for a new philosophizing. (shrink)

RESUMO Seguindo a elevação de outros dons naturais do espírito humano a categorias ou princípios estéticos, o que ocorreria gradualmente durante o século XVIII, o génio e as suas várias problemáticas tornam-se uma das mais prementes questões na agenda filosófica da época. Entre outros, a questão assume particular relevância na filosofia de Immanuel Kant, e isso não apenas na sua obra publicada, mas também na sua actividade como Professor. O presente texto propõe-se abordar a questão do génio nas lições de (...) antropologia do filósofo, e, tomando isto como ensejo, cumprir dois objectivos centrais: em primeiro lugar, traçar uma brevíssima história do conceito desde o século XVII até Kant, a fim de perceber que emprego desta faria o filósofo, e como ele próprio se associa ou dissocia desta. Segundo, compreender o modo como, dada a sua percepção histórica do termo, a teoria do génio em Kant trilha um curso singular, distinto em relação ao dos seus contemporâneos, e que faz com que o génio ostente uma posição central no seio da sua própria teoria; pois, na visão de Kant, o génio não só desempenha um importante papel como mediador das faculdades do ânimo humano, como é ainda peça indispensável na boa proporção entre estes e na insuspeitada produção de conhecimento por isto gerada. ABSTRACT Following the ascension of other natural gifts of the human spirit to the condition of categories or aesthetic principles, which would occur gradually during the 18th century, the topic of genius and its various issues becomes one of the most important questions in the philosophical agenda of the time. Among others, the question assumes particular relevance in Immanuel Kant's philosophy, not only in his published work, but also in his activity as a professor. The following text intends to approach the question of genius in the philosopher's Lectures on Anthropology, and taking the latter into account, to fulfil two central objectives: first, to etch a brief history of the concept from the 17th century until Kant, so as to realize what use Kant would make of this evolution, and how he himself associates or dissociates from it. Secondly, we intend to understand how Kant's theory of genius describes its own singular course, different from the ones of his contemporaries, and renders the genius a central piece within his own theory; for, in Kant's view, the genius not only plays an important role as mediator of the faculties of the spirit, but it is also an indispensable factor in the proportion between the latter, and in the unsuspected production of knowledge thus generated. (shrink)

RESUMO A história do estatuto, bem como da posição da memória entre semelhantes forças, desde a formação do conceito moderno da antropologia, durante toda a tradição leibniz-wolffinana, e até Kant, é uma história de mudança ascendente, de cristalização de ambos os predicados desta faculdade, e também uma de grande influência sobre a história do próprio pensamento antropológico. O presente ensaio propõe-se analisar como Kant receberia essa evolução, e como ele sobre ela actuaria. Isto é, centrando-nos nas “Lições de Antropologia”, e (...) sobre a “Antropologia num Enfoque Pragmático”, queremos indagar até que ponto Kant daria continuidade à referida tradição, mas, sobretudo, a partir de onde este com ela rompe, talhando ele próprio um novo capítulo nessa história, e também na história da antropologia; mais concretamente, importa conhecer a posição de Kant em relação a Platner ou Hume e suas concepções de memória, sua cisão em relação a estes, e sua proposta de todo um reposicionamento, e também revalorização do estatuto da memória entre faculdades da alma; e, por fim, perceber como Kant traz estes propósitos a bom porto, a saber, por meio da memória judiciosa, a única que abre não só para as ciências, mas também para a faculdade de imaginação produtiva, e para a poesia, e portanto também a única capaz de unir inferiores e superiores faculdades da alma, e instaurar harmonia entre estas. ABSTRACT The history of the status, as well as the position of memory among similar forces, since the genesis of the modern concept of anthropology, during the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition, and until Kant, is a history of ascending transformation, a crystallization of both this faculty’s attributes, and also one of great influence on the history of anthropological thought itself. The present essay aims at analyzing how Kant would receive that evolution, and how he would act upon it. That is, by focusing on the “Lectures on Anthropology”, and on “Anthropology on a Pragmatic Point of View”, we wish to inquire to what extent Kant would resume the aforementioned tradition, but, above all, from which point he breaks with it, thus carving he himself a new chapter in that history, and also in the history of anthropology; namely, it is our objective to ascertain Kant’s position regarding Platner or Hume and their conceptions of memory, his scission from the latter two, and his proposition of a whole repositioning, and also revaluation of the status of memory among faculties of the soul; and finally, understanding how Kant succeeds in these purposes, namely, through the concept of judicious memory, the only one which enables not only sciences, but also the productive faculty of imagination, and hence poetry, and therefore the only one able to unite both inferior and superior faculties of the soul and to sow harmony between the latter. (shrink)

Trata-se de uma resenha das obras Sobrinho de Rameau de Denis Diderot, Sobre a Verdade e Mentira no sentido Extra-Moral de Friedrich Nietzsche e A construção das ciências: introdução à filosofia e á ética das ciências de Gerárd Fourez. Os textos foram lidos com base nas seguintes questões: Quais são as bases de sustentação do conhecimento?; O que é a verdade e se é possível alcançá-la de forma objetiva; O que é a ciência e o que ela representa na busca (...) pela verdade e o conhecimento? e Quais as possibilidades da linguagem na busca pelo conhecimento? Concluiu-se que o que Diderot caracteriza como idiotismo aparenta-se com os valores morais seguidos pelo instinto de rebanho nos indivíduos de Nietzsche. Para Fourez observar é sempre representar e na representação nunca se obtém do objeto sua verdadeira essência. Desconstruir conceitos, apreender o aspecto fluido e mutável das coisas e dos valores, seria essa a linha mestra dos textos tratados neste trabalho. (shrink)

RESUMO: Fruto de longa maturação filosófica desde a sua estada em Jena, e instado a isso pelas influências de Karl L. Reinhold e Johann G. Fichte, o poeta Novalis produz, a partir do outono de 1795, um conjunto de anotações fragmentárias sobre a filosofia de Fichte, hoje conhecidas como Fichte-Studien. De entre os importantes temas aí abordados, um revela-se particularmente interessante: o tema do estatuto da Filosofia no seio do problema da autocompreensão do Eu -, e mais concretamente, o necessário (...) pensar da filosofia sobre si própria, as alterações que no processo têm de sobrevir à própria filosofia e a repercussão disto na compreensão de si próprio do Eu. Nesta senda, o seguinte ensaio propõe-se mostrar como, para Novalis, a filosofia é o natural pensar do homem, e como para além disto é a própria filosofia, com o decorrer do seu pensamento sobre si própria, que molda o curso da compreensão de si próprio do Eu: quer tendo com o Eu uma origem comum, nascendo com ele, lançando-o para o mundo e cindindo a união originária em que ele de outro modo sempre estaria, quer, por fim, afirmando-se como carência deste, ou como algo por que o Eu e a própria filosofia têm de passar no seu curso, para que possam experienciar a perda, e almejar à recuperação dessa origem. ABSTRACT: Fruit of a long philosophical maturation that began with his stay in Jena, and encouraged by the influence of Karl L. Reinhold and Johann G. Fichte, the poet Novalis produced, from autumn 1795 on, a set of fragmentary notes on the philosophy of Fichte. These are now known as Fichte-Studien. Among the important issues treated in the notes, one appears particularly interesting: the treatment of the theme of philosophy within the problem of the self-understanding of the "I" - and, more specifically, the need for philosophy to think about itself, about the changes that must come upon philosophy during this process, and about the impact of these on the self-understanding of the "I". The present article aims to show how, for Novalis, philosophy is the natural thought of man. Furthermore, it aims to show how philosophy, in the course of its thought on itself, shapes the course of the self-understanding of the "I", having with the "I" a common origin, being born with it, launching it into the world, cleaving the original union in which it otherwise would always be, and finally asserting itself as a lack of this union, something through which the "I" and philosophy itself must pass in their course so they can experience this loss and aim to recover its source. (shrink)

This book presents a critical reconsideration of the Kantian cognitive and practical subject. Special attention is devoted to highlight the complex relation between subjectivity as it is presented in the three critiques and the way in which it is construed in other writings, in particular the Anthropology. While for Kant our cognitive apparatus and the structure of our will are common to all humans, the anthropological subject reveals degrees of variation, depending on a myriad of external circumstances that pose a (...) challenge to the unity of Kant's account and await theoretical solutions. The essays collected in the volume delve into how the different shapes of human nature are not unrelated. They explore how and why different "Kantian subjects" are closely connected and at their core, if not entirely unified. The notions of personality, humanity, and citizenship will serve as leading threads for the reconstruction of this possible underlying unity. An engaging read that promises to deepen our understanding of human nature, the volume will be of great interest to scholars and researchers of philosophy, politics, psychology, social anthropology, ethics, and epistemology. (shrink)

Inertia is enshrined in Newton’s first law of motion, a body at rest or in uniform motion remains in that state unless a force is applied to it. Now, consider (1). (1) Pat stopped the car before it hit the tree. Can we conclude from (1) that the car struck the tree? Not without further information such as that supplied in (2). (2) But the bus behind kept going. A post-condition for Pat stopping the car is that the car be (...) at rest. To satisfy a pre-condition for the car hitting the tree (namely, that the car not be at rest), inertia requires that some intervening force act on the car (as hinted, for example, by (2)). In the absence of such a force, (1) would appear to suggest that Pat prevented a collision between car and tree. Exactly what bit of physics are we importing into natural language interpretation here? Oversimplified, Newton’s first law of motion says: no change without force. Identifying force with cause, we come to the slogan no temporality without cause, capturing in a phrase the proposal from Steedman 2000 that.. (shrink)

This book explores the notion of endangerment which stands at the heart of a network of concepts, values and practices dealing with objects considered threatened by extinction, and with the procedures aimed at preserving them. It looks at some of the fundamental ways in which this process involves science, but also more than science: not only data and knowledge and institutions, but also affects and values. With a focus on endangerment sensibility, it encapsulates tensions between the normative and the utilitarian, (...) the natural and the cultural. (shrink)

This paper first illustrates what kind of ethical issues arise from the new information, communication and automation technology. It then argues that we may embrace the popular idea that technology is ethically neutral or even ambivalent without having to close our eyes to those issues and in fact, that the ethical neutrality of technology makes them all the more urgent. Finally, it suggests that the widely ignored fact of normal responsible behaviour offers a new and fruitful starting point for any (...) future thinking about such issues. (shrink)